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glossary 
Balloon loan:  a loan which either does not amortize (no principal payments) or amortizes slowly, 
requiring a large lump sum repayment when it matures. 
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs): synthetic (derivative) bonds with different legal and sequential 
rights to part of the stream of income from a pool of mortgages 
Covered bond: a pool of mortgages sold by a bank to the capital market but which stay on a bank’s 
books and are usually guaranteed by that bank 
Credit risk:  the risk that a borrower might default on a loan 
Interest risk: the risk that interest rates might change, thus causing the capitalized asset value of a given 
stream of income to change in the opposite direction 
Mortgage backed security: a pool of mortgages sold by a bank to the capital market that do not remain 
on the bank’s books 
Mortgagee:  The person or entity lending money to a buyer against the security of the real property 
being bought 
Mortgager: The person or entity who borrows money to buy a house, putting up that property as 
collateral for the loan 
Securitization: bundling assets, like mortgages, together to sell them to capital markets 
 
 
Synopsis 
The role that mortgage backed securities played in the financial crisis of 2007-09 creates a misleading 
impression that mortgages necessarily cause macro-economic instability. But the problem lies in the 
specific structure of mortgage instruments, how market actors use them, and the matching of 
maturities. Mortgages can supply long maturity assets that match the demand for those assets by 
pension plans and insurance firms. By matching maturities, this can be a stabilizing force. This article 
considers the different kinds of mortgages, shows their connections to financial markets, and stresses 
that governments everywhere have structured mortgage markets for political and prudential reasons.  
 
[Article Text:] 
 
General Considerations 
The central role that mortgage backed securities played in the financial crisis of 2007-09 creates a 
misleading impression that mortgages necessarily cause macro-economic instability. But the problem 
lies in the specific structure of mortgage instruments, how market actors use them, and the matching of 
maturities. Mortgages and mortgage backed securities (XREF) theoretically can supply long maturity 
assets that match pension plans’ and insurance firms’ demand for those assets. By matching maturities, 
mortgages and derivatives of mortgage products can be a stabilizing force. At the same time, 
mismatched maturities can create considerable instability, either by reinforcing existing cyclic trends or 
by contributing to a systemic financial crisis. Finally, the macro-economic significance and effects of 
mortgages obviously rises as their share of private debt (and thus by definition financial system assets) 
rises. This article considers the different kinds of mortgages, shows their connections to financial 
markets, and stresses that governments everywhere have structured mortgage markets for political and 
prudential reasons.  
 
Mortgages have two different kinds of macro-economic and macro-systemic consequences, captured by 
interest rate risk (XREF) and credit risk (XREF). Interest rate risk is the risk that rates will rise (or fall), 
possibly increasing costs to the borrower, and possibly increasing the lender’s funding costs. Credit risk 
is the risk that a borrower might default, obliging the lender to cover the loss to themselves or their 
creditors from their own funds. Mismatched maturities aggravate the consequences of credit risk. Both 
can have pro-cyclic effects, exaggerating booms and busts and thus increasing instability. 
 
Mortgages by definition are an asset and a liability. From the borrower’s point of view, the mortgage 
creates a liability, as borrowers are obliged to make interest payments (XREF) on the loan, and usually, 
amortize (XREF) the loan via principal repayment (XREF). The amortization of a mortgage creates a 
stream of payments, usually but not always blending principal and interest. If a bank retains the 
mortgage, then the bank has an asset on its books, because it receives this stream of interest income. 
Alternately, the bank can find some way to sell off the mortgage in a secondary market through some 
form of securitization, creating an asset for a third party. 
 
Making mortgages historically exposed banks to considerable interest rate risk and a large maturity 
mismatch. This is why banks in the era before state regulation made few housing mortgages to 
individuals, and then usually only to people who were already in the propertied classes. Mortgages on 
individually owned urban housing were usually too small to have macro-economic consequences 
compared to agricultural mortgages or lending for corporately owned housing. Typically large scale 
mortgage markets only emerged after a state regulatory regime ameliorated interest and maturity risks; 
the more regulation ameliorated the risks, the larger the resulting market. The larger the market the 
greater the macro-economic risks, and thus the more intensive and intrusive government regulation 
became. Equally important, governments had to stabilize the incomes of individual mortgagers so that 
homebuyers could countenance taking on long term debt. 
 
Unregulated banks face risks because they fund long term, illiquid mortgages with short term, liquid 
deposits. Interest rate risks arise because the interest rate on deposits fluctuates from day to day (or 
whatever the time period for the deposit is). Mortgages typically are offered at a longer term and a fixed 
interest rate. Banks plan to profit from the spread between the lower, short term interest rate offered 
to depositors and the higher, long term rate offered to mortgagers. But if short term interest rates rise, 
the bank may find itself paying more interest to depositors than it received from mortgagers. The longer 
the interest rate squeeze, the greater the danger to the bank’s profits and eventually its capital. This 
problem was a major precipitating factor in the 1989-1992 US savings and loan crisis. US savings and 
loan banks (i.e. the US version of sparkassen (XREF) or building societies (XREF)) with large portfolios of 
low interest, long term mortgages on their books suddenly found themselves having to pay much higher 
interest rates to attract depositor money when interest rates were deregulated. 
 
As noted above, the maturity mismatch is baked in right from the start – it is an initial source of bank 
profits. The maturity mismatch arises from the fact that short term depositors can come to the bank and 
withdraw their money at any time. But it is much more difficult for the bank to extract that much money 
from a borrower. Liquidating a house (or farm) can take a considerable amount of time. Meanwhile 
depositors, facing delay, will clamour for more of their money out of fear that the bank cannot honour 
its liabilities to them. The maturity mismatch can thus create a spiral of fear culminating in a bank run. 
Naturally, depositors in an unregulated system are more likely to be afraid at a time of cyclic downturn. 
Banks trying to borrow so as to avoid liquidating properties in a bad market could find themselves 
unable to obtain funds, leading to a bank crash. This makes mortgage lending very pro-cyclic. In bad 
times, banks stop extending mortgage loans, leading to a general fall in the price of real property. In turn 
the falling price of property makes banks unwilling to lend against depreciating collateral. And as 
property prices fall and borrowers default on their mortgages, banks find themselves the unwilling 
owners of devaluing property they cannot sell in order to repay their own liabilities to depositors. 
 
State regulation of banking in general and mortgages in particular is supposed to ameliorate these risks. 
The degree and kind of regulation varies considerably, as does its effectiveness. The central point, 
however, is that extensive mortgage markets would not come into being on their own. Modern 
mortgage markets, mainly in agricultural land, emerged in Europe, North America, Argentina and 
Australia in the mid to late 1800s. States in these economies typically established specialized banks to 
extend long term credit to farmers. Thus the French state created the Crédit Foncier bank in 1852 and 
gave it a monopoly on mortgage lending. Similarly, the Danish state reformed mortgage laws in 1850, 
allowed banks to form freely after 1857, and made borrowers jointly liable for each other’s debts. In 
both cases mortgages were funded through what we would now call a covered bond system (XREF?). 
This is an early form of securitization in which banks originate mortgages, and fund those mortgages by 
selling them as bonds to outside investors. However, those bonds remain on the bank’s books and are 
guaranteed by the bank. Covered bonds (as Pfandbrief [XREF] in Germany, or pantbrev [XREF] in 
Denmark) still account for the vast majority of European mortgage securities. 
 
The covered bond and crédit foncier systems removed both interest rate risk and the maturity mismatch 
from private banks. Interest rate risk was largely moved onto the buyers of the bond. More important, 
the bond buyers presumably wanted a long dated asset. Long term mortgages could thus be funded by 
long term investors’ money rather than short term depositors’ money. Those long term investors would 
be matching a long term liability, an outflow of money – for example annuitized pension payments – to 
their long term flow of income from the mortgage asset. These 19th century mortgage systems gradually 
extended their ambit from agricultural land to urban housing.  
 
Banks also protected themselves (or buyers of covered bonds) from interest rate risks by requiring 
higher down payments (purchase money) (XREF) and quicker amortization than loans on farm land. 
Down payments usually amounted to 50 percent of the purchase price, and 5 year balloon loans (XREF) 
were common. Balloon loans are either interest only loans, with the entire debt repayable at the end of 
the term, or they are amortized as if they are longer term loans (for example, on a 20 or 30 year 
schedule) but the remaining balance on the loan is repayable after only 5 or 10 years. Balloon loans 
forced borrowers to renegotiate the interest rate every time the balloon payment was due, protecting 
banks and bond buyers against adverse interest rate movements. If interest rates had risen, borrowers 
would have to re-borrow at the higher rate. 
 
The State and the Mortgage Market 
After the Great Depression and World War II, most countries created some kind of dedicated, state-
owned housing bank, like the Norwegian Husbanken (XREF) or the Japanese Government Housing Loan 
Corporation (XREF), to provide long term credit to housing markets. While these eventually yielded part 
of the market to private banks, they enabled a vast expansion of private, individual home-ownership 
and a vast expansion of the share of mortgage debt in total private debt. The US and Danish mortgage 
systems present the apotheosis of government systems for removing maturity mismatches from a 
largely private banking system by respectively using full securitization and covered bonds. We will 
consider the US system in depth as it is the world’s largest mortgage market, with roughly $11 trillion in 
home mortgage debt (of which $6.6 trillion had been securitized) in 2008. The modern US mortgage 
market emerged from the chaos of the Great Depression, when the pro-cyclic dynamics sketched above 
caused a total collapse of the banking system as well as housing prices. At that time the United States 
had a typical, if weak, version of the 19th century system. Banks offered 5 year balloon loans to home 
buyers who could make a 50 percent down payment. During the 1930s, unemployment was so high that 
many buyers could not afford to refinance their balloon loans when they came due. A cascade of 
foreclosures led to falling home prices and failing banks, aggravating the general downturn. 
 
To help solve this problem, the US federal government created the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) (XREF) in 1933. HOLC refinanced maturing balloon loans into 25 and 30 year amortizing loans. 
When HOLC ran out of money, the federal government created the Federal National Mortgage Agency 
(FNMA or Fannie Mae (XREF)) in 1938 to create a national market for long term mortgage funding. 
Eventually Fannie Mae was privatized in 1968-70 (and then effectively renationalized in the 2008). 
Privatization spun out the unsubsidized portions of FMNA as FMNA, leaving behind “Ginnie Mae,” the 
Government National Mortgage Agency (XREF), to provide subsidized lending for public housing 
projects. Savings and loan banks got Freddie Mac (FHLMC – Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) 
(XREF), their own version of Fannie Mae, in 1970; it was fully privatized in 1989 and renationalized in 
2008.  
 
As the problems of the Great Depression disappeared, Fannie Mae helped to resolve the maturity 
mismatch problem around mortgages. As a government agency, Fannie Mae could issue long dated 
bonds with virtually no credit risk to securities markets, turn those funds around to buy mortgages from 
banks, and then hold those mortgages to maturity on its own books. Meanwhile, banks now had new 
funds to issue more mortgages. Fannie Mae thus indirectly matched long term investors with long term 
borrowers. Before then, firms that had long term liabilities had to create long term assets directly by 
building and operating large real estate complexes. For example, in the 1940s Metropolitan Life 
Insurance company built over 20,000 apartments in the Peter Cooper Town-Stuyvesant Village and 
Riverton complexes in New York City, not only matching maturities but also creating a walled garden in 
which beneficiaries funded their own insurance and pension receipts with their mortgage payments. 
Fannie Mae effectively did the same thing at a national level, internalizing and socializing the risks of 
making mortgages, and helping insurance and pension funds get out of the business of managing 
property.  Fannie Mae thus invented, enabled, and popularized the modern US small down payment, 30 
year amortization, fixed interest rate mortgage.  
 
Countries without a similar system for removing maturity and interest rate risks, still typically have 
shorter term, variable rate mortgages. Thus in Italy, the typical mortgage in the 20th century required a 
50 % down payment, had an annual interest rate reset, and had a 10 year amortization period. Until the 
early 2000s, securitization was impossible in Italy. These factors limited the size of the Italian mortgage 
market, rendering it less salient in terms of macro-economic stability. By contrast, systems with large 
amounts of mortgage debt and no stabilizing state institutions had very pro-cyclic mortgage systems. 
Australian mortgages, for example, are either variable rate or fixed for five years. Any change in interest 
rates thus flows through to homeowners almost immediately. If the central bank hikes rates, mortgage 
interest rates follow, sucking cash out of consumers’ hands, and amplifying the central bank’s effort to 
slow the economy. The reverse is also true. 
 
Securitization and Macro-stability 
Fannie Mae essentially invented the modern mortgage backed securities (MBS) market and the pass 
through MBS in 1981. (However, the Danish system of covered bonds had been operating a form of pass 
through securitization for almost a century at that point in time.)  The MBS market gave long term 
investors direct access to long term interest income, but without the headaches of property 
management, and with a bigger, and thus safer, risk pool. Freddie Mac invented the CMO, collateralized 
mortgage obligation, a derivative that slices up principal and interest payments so that investors can buy 
bonds with maturities and returns that vary from the underlying individual mortgages.  
 
To make an MBS, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would package mortgages with somewhat similar 
interest rates, maturities and credit risk into a huge pool with an average interest rate payout, maturity 
and credit risk. Long term investors bought a percentage of that MBS pool to get a pro rata share of 
principal and interest payments from the pool. Fannie and Freddie, acting as loan servicers, would ‘pass 
through’ these payments to investors. If the pool experienced a 1 % default rate, then all buyers of that 
pool experienced a pro rata 1 % loss on their share of the pool. To get a different interest rate, maturity 
or level of risk investors would need to buy a different MBS. Unlike more complicated derivatives, the 
mortgages in a pass through MBS stayed intact, allowing the MBS bond holders or the servicer to 
identify and foreclose on the defaulter. A defaulting mortgage only affected its own MBS pool, and 
conversely investors in that pool could foreclose defaulting homeowners without affecting other MBS 
pools. 
 
Even though the MBS system removed maturity mismatches, the US mortgage system concentrated 
enormous risks onto what theoretically had become private enterprises by the 1970s. Yet Fannie Mae’s 
and Freddie Mac’s own underwriting criteria and the general system of financial regulation in place 
before the 1990s mitigated these risks. The mortgages going into these pass through MBS had to 
conform to Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s underwriting standards – thus the adjective ‘conforming’ in 
conforming mortgage. These standards required a potential home-buyer to possess a good credit rating, 
to document that their total post-mortgage debt payments would consume no more than 34 % of their 
gross household income, to make a substantial down payment (usually over 10% and typically 20 %), 
and to borrow no more than 125 % of the median US home value. In short, homebuyers usually came 
from the cohort of people with well-paying and stable jobs. Consequently conforming mortgages had a 
default rate lower than 0.5 %. This reduced the risk that the GSEs would have to liquidate mortgages in a 
panic. Financial firms with large liabilities to the general public would stuff their portfolios with GSE pass 
through bonds to insulate themselves from downturns. 
 
These pass through MBS were thus in many ways a classic product of the Bretton Woods or ‘fordist’ 
(XREF) era welfare state. They socialized the risks in providing housing finance, implicitly homogenized 
investor returns, and favored debtors (because principal pre-payment was costless). They primarily gave 
mortgages to people who had stable employment and a good track record of meeting their debt 
obligations, which limited defaults. The system also theoretically prevented a cascade of foreclosures 
from causing a banking crash. As the economy turned down, the GSEs would bear most of the pain. But 
because banks could still make mortgages, housing prices would not fall continuously. Consequently the 
GSE system and its process of securitization were counter-cyclic and stabilizing. The same was true for 
the Danish covered bond system. 
 
The fact that US homebuyers had basically an unlimited right to pre-pay their mortgage (equivalent to a 
costless call on their bond in a covered bond system) reinforced this process. Two-thirds of the US 
population is homeowners, and mortgage debt constitutes roughly one-third of all private debt. 
Mortgage debt is thus macro-economically significant. In an economic downturn, interest rates would 
fall. Homeowners could retire their old, higher interest rate mortgages, take out new, lower interest 
rate mortgages, and then consume the difference in payments. This additional consumption would then 
put a floor under unemployment, helping to stabilize demand and restore economic growth. Conversely, 
if the central bank raised open market interest rates, homeowners with long maturity mortgages would 
not experience an increase in their mortgage payments, mitigating the contractionary effects of 
monetary policy. The system of securitization and widespread mortgage debt was thus counter-cyclical 
in downturns, and mildly pro-cyclical in upturns, until deregulation changed the way that MBS were 
constructed and who would buy them. 
 
Securitization and Macro-instability 
 
Financial deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s reversed the structural features through which the 
mortgage market helped stabilize the macro-economy after World War II. Post-war regulation had 
reduced interest rate risk and limited maturity mismatches, but both reemerged as deregulation 
proceeded. These old risks made mortgages and mortgage backed securities a potential force for 
instability. The peculiar American combination of subprime (non-conforming) mortgages bundled into 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (XREF) was particularly destabilizing, because it magnified both 
interest rate risks and maturity mismatches. In effect, subprime CDOs turned the entire post-war 
mortgage system on its head, by using short term money to give long term mortgages to risky 
customers, and implicating the entire financial system in the process.  
 
The CDO is a generic version of the CMO, produced by bundling a set of mortgage debts into a synthetic 
product. Deregulation allowed private investment and commercial banks to manufacture MBS and CDOs 
– so called private label MBS, in contrast to the GSE pass-through MBS. Private label MBS did not offer 
investors a pro rata share of payments from a given pool of mortgages. Instead, bankers took a pool of 
non-conforming mortgages, sliced them into different CDOs, and then assigned each CDO a specific legal 
priority (seniority) over the underlying flow of payments from the pool. Regardless of which mortgages 
made interest payments or principal prepayments, those payments were assigned first to the CDO with 
the highest legal priority (so-called ‘super senior’ tranches). This legal priority in claiming cash from the 
flow of payments is precisely what made some CDOs look low risk, even though the underlying 
mortgages might be subprime. 
 
CDOs are very much a product of the post-fordist era. They took mortgages from non-conforming 
households (in all senses), allowed short term investors to speculate and earn differential returns, and 
shifted risks to debtors. Almost by definition, most of the mortgages going into the pool of non-GSE MBS 
were non-conforming or subprime. If those mortgages had been conforming, they would have been 
offered to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac on account of their lower insurance and servicing costs. While not 
all non-conforming mortgages are subprime, almost all carry greater risks than do prime, conforming 
mortgages. As it turned out, the risk of default for subprime mortgages was roughly five to six times that 
for prime mortgages. By 2007, private label MBS and CDOs accounted for a quarter of the outstanding 
$11 trillion US residential mortgage debt.  
 
The GSEs sold pass through MBS to long term investors, thus matching maturities. Investment banks 
sold CDOs to short term investors – often themselves – thus mismatching maturities. Banks set up 
subsidiaries to buy CDOs. These subsidiaries – special purpose entities or structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs) – deliberately funded their CDO purchases with money borrowed on a short term basis from 
money markets. Investment banks hoped to profit from this deliberate maturity mismatch. The banks 
used their SIVs to borrow short term, 90 to 180 day cash to invest in CDOs built on 30 year mortgages. 
SIVs were profiting from the spread created by the apparent maturity difference between the long term 
CDOs that they held, and the short term money they borrowed from money markets. Longer term debt 
generally carries higher interest rates than short term debt, and longer term CDOs did yield higher 
interest, not least because subprime mortgages paid higher interest. The entire benefit of the spread 
between short and long term rates fell into the banks’ hands. Banks knew this strategy was risky, so they 
insured their operations through credit default swaps [XREF] from insurance companies like AIG. 
 
Like 19th century banks, these subsidiaries were completely vulnerable to any sudden demand from 
those money markets (depositors). Like 19th century banks, they were vulnerable to any rise in interest 
rates that might close the spread between their short term liabilities and long term assets. Unlike the 
19th century banks that crashed with lamentable frequency, these subsidiaries were tightly connected to 
the entire financial system, and thus created systemic risks. Not only were banks at risk, but also the 
entire short term lending system operated by the money markets (who were lending to SIVs) and also 
the insurance firms (who were insuring the SIVs). When subprime borrowers began to default, money 
market funds acted like depositors in a bank run. They refused to roll over their loans to SIVs (in effect 
asked to withdraw their deposits), forcing SIVs to liquidate their CDOs. As in prior crashes, forced sales 
led to falling asset prices and bankrupt banks. Deregulation thus permitted SIVs to turn a largely 
counter-cyclical system of mortgage origination and securitization deliberately built on matched 
maturities into a highly pro-cyclical and systemically dangerous system deliberately built on mismatched 
maturities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Mortgages and mortgage backed securities are not inherently macro-economically stabilizing or 
destabilizing. What matters is who is exposed to the risk of default, and what the consequences of 
default are. Post-war systems of financial regulation generally encouraged an expansion of private 
home-ownership and thus of mortgage debt. But they did so in ways that matched maturities and 
largely removed maturity mismatches from banks’ books. They also did so by selectively providing 
mortgages to households with stable incomes. By matching maturities and lending to prime borrowers 
they damped down the risks of large scale defaults and thus of financial crises. Post 1990 financial 
deregulation, especially in the United States, encouraged even more homeownership and yet larger 
mortgages. But deregulation allowed and encouraged private actors, particularly commercial and 
investment banks, to recreate the destabilizing maturity mismatches of the pre-regulation era. It also 
permitted banks to accept the risk of default, even though this was systemically destabilizing. The 
consequences in 2007-2009 are not surprising. But securitization, properly managed and regulated, can 
provide mortgage credit to the masses while making it possible for pension funds and insurance firms to 
find the long maturity assets they need to make their businesses work. This is inherently stabilizing 
macro-economically. 
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